IMAGE: THE HIMALAYAN
ON MARCH 5TH Nepal’s voters delivered a verdict on the old political order, handing the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) a near-supermajority. But they also endorsed something more specific: a 40-page manifesto that promises to remake the Himalayan republic’s economy by making electricity cheap enough to mine bitcoin and turning IT into a $30bn export industry. Balen Shah, the RSP’s 35-year-old leader, now faces the harder task of governing with the same velocity he brought to campaigning.
Nepal’s economy has grown at some 4% on average over the past two decades or so, held back by policy uncertainty as well as bureaucratic predation and a private sector that has learned to extract rents rather than create value. The RSP wants the state to withdraw from direct production—privatising or restructuring state-owned enterprises—while strengthening its capacity to regulate. Businesses would drive growth; government would provide education, healthcare and a predictable set of rules. This is the “social market economy” of the manifesto: competition with a cushion.
The numbers attached to that vision are ambitious enough to raise eyebrows in Kathmandu’s coffee houses. Seven per cent average annual growth over five to seven years. Per-capita income above $3,000, up from about $1,447 today. An economy that roughly doubles in size to $100bn. These targets assume productivity gains that have eluded every previous administration.
Yet the RSP’s most consequential proposal concerns something few voters think about: the exchange rate. For three decades Nepal has pegged its rupee to India’s, a policy that anchors inflation and simplifies trade but surrenders monetary independence. The party promises a review with international experts, studying whether the peg should be reformed or abandoned. That is a technical exercise with political dynamite attached. Any move towards flexibility would alarm importers, delight exporters and force Nepal to confront its structural dependence on Indian markets. The review alone will spook speculators.
The IT ambitions are bolder still. The RSP wants technology to become Nepal’s largest export sector, targeting $30bn in earnings within a decade—roughly nine times what the country currently exports in goods and services combined. The party would declare IT a national strategic industry, create a promotion board and allow loans backed by intellectual property. Digital parks would rise in all seven provinces, housing data centres cooled by Himalayan air and powered by Himalayan hydropower. The vision is plausible enough to attract venture capital; the scale is not.
Then comes the section that separates the party’s manifesto from its predecessors: cryptocurrency. The RSP proposes studying global regulations; crafting a national policy; and launching pilot projects for mining within a year. Nepal has abundant hydropower and cool climates—two inputs for the vast computing farms that generate new bitcoin. The party imagines exporting “green computing power” to Asia, turning electrons into digital assets before they leave the grid. It is the kind of idea that sounds visionary in opposition and legally fraught in government.
The fiscal maths receives less attention than it deserves. The RSP promises tax cuts—allowing deductions for education, healthcare and child care—while maintaining revenue. It would eliminate retroactive taxation and reduce income taxes based on family burden. These are popular measures with an obvious problem: Nepal’s tax-to-GDP ratio, at about 17%, is already low by regional standards. The party’s answer lies in compliance rather than rates. A cashless economy, aggressively pursued, would shrink the informal sector that currently escapes the tax net. Digital transactions leave trails; trails lead to revenue.
Financial regulation gets the same treatment. Cooperatives and microfinance institutions, which have generated waves of depositor protests in recent years, would face stricter oversight. The central bank would supervise all non-bank financial institutions. A national savings protection fund would compensate small depositors within 100 days of the government forming. Loan sharking—”meter interest” in local parlance—would be treated as economic crime and eliminated within five years. These are promises that write cheques the bureaucracy must cash.
The RSP’s real bet is demographic. Nepal has perhaps 25 years before its working-age population begins to shrink, a window the party insists must be used to escape low-income status. That means creating 500,000 technology jobs, luring digital nomads with special visas and allowing Nepalis to work remotely for foreign companies without leaving home. It means treating the country’s young people as an export commodity that does not require emigration.
Mr Shah must now form a government, appoint a cabinet and face the machinery he has spent years attacking. The civil service will not reform itself. The old parties will not vanish. The exchange rate peg, reviewed or not, will resist sudden movement because India prefers stability and Nepal cannot afford to displease its northern neighbour. The RSP’s manifesto reads like a start-up prospectus: high risk, high reward, heavy on vision and light on implementation detail. That is what voters wanted. They will soon discover whether governing resembles coding or whether it more closely resembles moving a boulder with a very small lever. ■







